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A Classless Act
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ERRONEOUS CLASS
CERTIFICATION IN DUKES V. WAL-MART, INC.
INTRODUCTION
In June of 2004, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California certified the largest private civil
rights lawsuit in United States history – Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Inc. 1 The proposed class is comprised of at least 1.5 million
women, 2 all of whom work or have worked at one of
approximately 3,400 Wal-Mart stores across the United
The plaintiffs claim that Wal-Mart sexually
States. 3
discriminated against them because they were paid less than
men “in comparable positions,” “receive[d] fewer promotions to
in-store management than d[id] men” and those who received
promotions “wait[ed] longer than their male counterparts to
advance.” 4 The plaintiffs are seeking class-wide injunctive and
declaratory relief, lost pay and punitive damages pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”). 5
The district court certified the class in Dukes using the
criteria set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Rule
23(a), governing class certification, contains four requirements 7
that must be met in order for a class to be certified. These
requirements are: (1) “the class is so numerous that joinder of
1
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
David Kravets, Class Action Against Wal-Mart Approved, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
June 23, 2004, at 4.
2
See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142. The 1.5 million women are represented by
six plaintiffs: Betty Dukes, Patricia Surgeson, Christine Kwapnoski, Deborah Gunter,
Edith Arana, and Cleo Page. See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 3 n. 1, Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. Ca. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
3
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142, n.1. Wal-Mart operates four types of stores:
Discount Stores, Supercenters, Sam’s Clubs and Neighborhood Markets. Id. at 141,
n.1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2).
7
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253
F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 275 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” 8 These factors
are also known as: numerosity, commonality, typicality and
adequacy. 9 Rule 23(b) provides that the class must fulfill one of
three additional requirements: (1) that separate actions by
individual members of the class would produce inconsistent
judgments; (2) that the party opposing the class “has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class”
making injunctive and/or declaratory relief appropriate; or (3)
that any issues pertaining to individual members of the class
are outweighed by issues that pertain to the class as a whole
and that a class action lawsuit is the best method to adjudicate
the issue or issues. 10
Class action lawsuits are an exception to the rule that
litigation is normally conducted only on behalf of individuals
and not individuals representing a group and, as such, a class
must be carefully evaluated before it is certified. 11 In General
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 12 the Supreme Court
concluded that in a Title VII class action lawsuit, a court must
conduct a “rigorous analysis” 13 to ensure “that the prerequisites
of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” 14 The Dukes court, however,
deemphasized the importance of the Supreme Court’s “rigorous
analysis” standard and held that a court maintains “broad
discretion [in] determin[ing] whether a class should be
certified.” 15 By stressing the court’s ability to use “broad
discretion,” 16 the Dukes court found that the class met all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a). In doing so, the court pointed to
8

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143.
10
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
11
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
12
Id.
13
Id. at161. See also Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180,
1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 275 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).
14
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161. See also In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust
Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677, 684 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (stating that the court would “scrutinize the
evidence plaintiffs propose to use in proving their claims without unnecessarily
reaching the merits of underlying claims.”).
15
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871
n.28 (9th Cir. 2001)).
16
Id.
9
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evidence of a strong and centralized corporate culture 17 at WalMart, which enabled it to control all of the stores and their
operations. 18 Such control laid the groundwork for the entire
class to suffer an injury, which resulted from a specific
discriminatory practice. 19 Because the class possibly contains
1.5 million women, neither side challenged the class’s ability to
meet Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement. Such a large class,
though, can backfire against a class, as will be discussed in
Section IV. 20 The court also held that the class met the
requirement of Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the primary purpose
of the litigation is to seek injunctive and declaratory relief,
even though class members are seeking punitive damages. 21
According to Rule 23(b)(2), injunctive relief must outweigh any
punitive damages sought in order to maintain class action
status. 22 In this case, the court held that the injunctive relief
related to ending sexual discrimination at Wal-Mart
“predominates” 23 over any possible punitive award, even one
that could be in the billions of dollars. 24
17
As evidence of Wal-Mart’s strong corporate culture, the Dukes court noted
that “every new employee nation-wide goes through the same orientation process
and . . . is trained about the Wal-Mart culture. Thereafter, employees at Wal-Mart
stores attend a daily meeting . . . where managers discuss company culture and
employees do the Wal-Mart cheer. Employees also receive weekly training on culture
topics at mandatory store meetings.” Id. at 151 (citations omitted). While the court
pointed to these characteristics as evidence of a strong corporate culture, there is no
connection between a corporation maintaining a strong corporate culture, on the one
hand, and, making local store managers responsible for hiring and promotion decisions,
on the other hand.
18
Id. at 145-53. This evidence was used to satisfy the commonality
requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Id. at 145.
19
Id. at 167-68. This evidence was used to satisfy the typicality requirement
of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Id. at 166-68.
20
See infra Section IV.
21
Dukes, at 170-71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) only provides for injunctive and
declaratory relief and not punitive damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). A 1991
Amendment to Title VII allowed for punitive damages if the plaintiff could prove that
the employer discriminated “with malice or with reckless indifference . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§1981a(b)(1) (1991).
22
The monetary damages must be “secondary to the primary claim for
injunctive or declaratory relief.” Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (1986)).
23
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 171.
24
Given the potential size of the class, it would seem quite obvious that any
punitive damages award would be in the billions of dollars and would clearly outweigh
any declaratory or injunctive relief that would be granted to the class. One can assume
that this case would result in an award in the billions of dollars given the fact that in
1999 a 10,000 employee sexual discrimination lawsuit settled for $25 million; if this
award was divided equally among claimants, each claimant received $2,500. See
William C. Martucci et. al., Class Action Litigation in the Employment Arena – the
Corporate Employers’ Perspective, 58 J. MO. B. 332, 336 (2002). Assuming an
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This Note will argue that the Northern District of
California incorrectly certified the class in Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores. 25 Part II proceeds with an in-depth description of
Dukes. Part III then continues with a discussion of Rule 23
and its requirements. Part IV discusses why the court was
incorrect in finding that the class in Dukes met the
requirements of commonality and typicality. Because this Note
only challenges the court’s finding in Dukes regarding
commonality and typicality, any issues regarding numerosity
and/or adequacy of representation are not discussed. Part IV
also discusses the court’s use of expert witness testimony in
certifying the class, and the importance of using a Daubert
analysis in order to analyze potential expert witness testimony
to certify a class. Part V discusses the Title VII issues which
are present in this case, and explains why the court should
have denied class certification based on these issues. Part VI
argues that the court incorrectly ignored the issue of blackmail
settlements and that the class should not have been certified
because of the concern regarding blackmail settlements. 26 Part
VII proposes a method for certifying class action lawsuits
similar to the Dukes case. More specifically, the proposal will
suggest that certification not be granted for “wall to wall” or
“across the board” class action lawsuits. Keeping in line with
many other cases involving corporate parents, the proposal will
limit the instances in which a class action lawsuit can be
brought to cases where, unlike in Dukes, specific corporate
policies existed that promoted a definite practice and where the
corporate parent actively engaged in the day to day hiring,
firing and promoting of employees. The method will finally
equivalent settlement per person here, the total award in this case would be $3.75
billion. At the high end of the scale, a 1992 sexual discrimination case against State
Farm involving 814 women settled for $157 million. Id. at 336, Appendix. Therefore,
each claimant received $192,874.69. Id. Extrapolating this value to the Wal-Mart case
would result in a total settlement value of $289,312,039,312. Wal-Mart’s market
capitalization is only around $182,000,000,000. See Summary of WAL MART
STORES, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=WMT&d=t (last visited Oct. 2,
2005). Therefore, any award approaching the high end of the scale would bankrupt
Wal-Mart and possibly force Wal-Mart to layoff thousands of employees. This result
cannot be considered secondary to any injunctive or declaratory relief sought by the
class.
25
Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear WalMart’s appeal of the lower court’s class certification. A decision in that case is pending.
Principal Br. For Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at 1-2 (9th Cir.
2004) (Nos. 04-16688 & 04-16720).
26
Briefly, blackmail settlements occur when a group of plaintiffs try to
gather as many potential class members as possible in order to scare the defendant
into settling, rather than risk facing a jury award. See infra nn. 253-58.
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propose that allegations of sexual discrimination are best left to
be heard on a more individual level, or at the very least, that
class action lawsuits should be brought on a smaller scale,
rather than as one class action lawsuit encompassing 1.5
million women.
I.

DUKES V. WAL-MART: AN IN-DEPTH OVERVIEW

In Dukes, the named plaintiffs include six women, each
of whom worked for Wal-Mart either as an hourly or salaried
worker in stores across the country. 27 Despite claiming to
represent women across the country, all of the representative
plaintiffs worked in stores in California, three of whom worked
at stores outside of California before moving to California. 28
Additionally, only one of the lead plaintiffs, Christine
Kwapnoski, briefly occupied a salaried position. 29 All of the
women worked at a Wal-Mart store since at least 1997. 30
All of the named plaintiffs describe a set of policies
which, they allege, point to a general policy by Wal-Mart to
sexually discriminate against women. 31 More specifically, the
plaintiffs claim that as females, Wal-Mart’s policies hindered
their ability to receive promotions. 32 Plaintiffs also claim that
female Wal-Mart employees received less pay than men for
performing the same tasks. 33 As a general basis for their
claims, plaintiffs argue that Wal-Mart employed an excessively
subjective decision-making process regarding their employment
and possible promotions, which created an environment for
sexual discrimination. 34 Wal-Mart’s policy mandated that an
hourly worker could only become a manager by participating in
the Management Training Program. 35 The plaintiffs allege
27
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification, at 17-18, n.9, Dukes v. WalMart, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
28
Id. Plaintiff Page worked in a Supercenter in Oklahoma before moving to
California. Plaintiff Gunter worked in a Discount Store in Texas before moving to
California and Plaintiff Kwapnoski worked in a Sam’s Club in Missouri before
transferring to a Sam’s Club in California. See id.
29
Id. at 17-18 n.9. It should be noted that she only held an entry-level
managerial position as a Receiving Area Manager. Id.
30
See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 1, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
31
See id. at 1-4.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149-50.
35
See id. at 148. In order to participate in the Management Training
Program, an hourly employee must rise to the level of a Support Manager. See id.
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that, until recently, managers chose which employees would
participate in the Program through a “tap on the shoulder”
system. 36 Under this system, managers chose candidates to
participate in the Management Training Program by deciding
for themselves who might make a good manager, rather than
by relying on set guidelines. 37 The named plaintiffs allege that
this type of system suffered from “excessive subjectivity” 38 in
that male managers would pick male hourly employees to
participate in the Management Training Program, more
frequently than female employees. 39
Wal-Mart claims that, as the corporate parent, it cannot
be held responsible for decisions made by store managers
because the managers made decisions based on a certain
amount of subjectivity. 40 Moreover, despite the plaintiffs’
contentions regarding the nexus between excessive subjectivity
and sexual discrimination, Wal-Mart cited a Ninth Circuit
case, Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., to show that excessive
subjectivity is not necessarily evidence of sexual
discrimination. 41 In Coleman, plaintiffs claimed that Quaker
Oats committed age discrimination when, in the process of
carrying out a large-scale layoff, it laid off two-thirds of
workers over age forty. 42 In determining whom to lay off,
Quaker Oats considered an employee’s rankings in six areas
and his overall ranking. 43 The Ninth Circuit held in Coleman
that Quaker Oats did not use an excessively subjective
evaluation system in order to mask its true intention of firing
the older employees. 44 Similarly, Wal-Mart argues that even
36

See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). The plaintiff’s allege that this policy existed until
recently citing that in January 2003, Wal-Mart moved from a “tap on the shoulder”
program to posting job vacancies in the Management Program. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D.
at 149.
37
See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
38
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149.
39
See Pl.’s Mot. For Class Certifcation at 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
40
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification, at 4, 6-7, 14-15, 23-24,
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
41
See id. at 32 n. 19 (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285
(9th Cir. 2000) (“While a subjective evaluation system can be used as a cover for illegal
discrimination, subjective evaluations are not unlawful per se and ‘their relevance to
proof of discriminatory intent is weak’”)) (quoting Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudson Co.,
804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)).
42
Coleman, 232 F.3d 1271, 1278-79.
43
Id. at 1278.
44
Id. at 1285.
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though it used a subjective system to evaluate employees, such
a system does not necessarily mean that it maintained sexually
discriminatory practices.
At Wal-Mart, managers are given a certain amount of
leeway with regard to some aspects of pay and promotion. 45
Wal-Mart asserts that when making decisions regarding pay,
although it sets a range for each class of employee, store
managers are able to depart from that scale. 46 Wal-Mart
argues, therefore, that because store managers control their
individual stores as they see fit, Wal-Mart, as the corporate
parent, cannot be held responsible for the individual pay
decisions made by each store manager. 47
Similarly, Wal-Mart also claims that it cannot be held
responsible for promotion decisions, because store managers
make those decisions on a store-by-store basis. 48 The plaintiffs
even admit that store managers make promotion decisions on
their own by choosing which hourly employees will participate
in the Management Training Program. 49 Wal-Mart claims that
the purpose of this policy is to allow store managers to identify
those people who they believe will make the best managers. 50
Wal-Mart argues that managers are best equipped to
determine who would make a good manager, not a corporate
officer who has virtually no knowledge of each of the stores’
employees. 51
In looking at the Dukes case, the court faced a number
of issues that speak to the heart of Rule 23 and class
certification. Issues of subjectivity in hiring, promotion and
pay practices at Wal-Mart raise concerns as to whether a class
45

See generally Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
See Def.’s Opp’n to Class Certification, at 14-15, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). After store managers decide to depart from the
pay scale, the district manager can then question the store manager’s decision, after
the fact, if the hourly rate departs from the standard minimum by more than 6%. See
Pl.’s Mot. For Class Certification at 17 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ)
47
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification, at 4, 6-7, 14-15, 23-24,
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
48
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 150.
49
Id. at 148.
50
See id. at 148. Wal-Mart only sets minimum standards for promoting
employees to the Management Training Program. Those standards include the
employee: “have an ‘above average’ evaluation, have at least one year in their current
position, be current on training, not be in a ‘high shrink’ department or store, be on the
company’s ‘Rising Star’ list, and be willing to relocate.” Id.
51
Id. The court later faults Wal-Mart for not overseeing promotion decisions
made by store managers given its ability to oversee such things as the type of music
played in each store. Id. at 151-53.
46
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can meet all the requirements of Rule 23. If in fact Wal-Mart
maintained excessively subjective practices in hiring,
promotion, and pay, then proving commonality and typicality
would appear to be quite difficult. Given the “increased
skepticism – particularly among members of the federal
judiciary – toward the class action as an effective disputeresolution mechanism in the employment context,” 52 courts
must carefully consider all of Rule 23’s requirements before
certifying a class.
II.

RULE 23

A.

An Overview

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
the framework for class action litigation. 53 A class action
lawsuit is a unique form of litigation because it seeks relief on
behalf of a large group of people not limited to the named
plaintiffs. 54 The reasons for allowing class action litigation are
fourfold: 1) it promotes judicial economy; 2) it provides a single
remedy for a group when it is uneconomical to seek multiple
remedies in individual lawsuits; 3) it provides greater plaintiff
access to courts through spreading of litigation costs; and 4) it
protects defendants from inconsistent jury verdicts. 55
As discussed earlier, Rule 23(a) contains four
requirements that a class must meet in order to be certified:
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. 56 If a class
meets all four of these requirements, it then must meet one of
the three further requirements of Rule 23(b). 57 Typically, civil
rights lawsuits fall under the rubric of Rule 23(b)(2) where the
“party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class,” 58 as described by the
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23, 59 because all the class
52
Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive? 37
AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004).
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
54
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982).
55
See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.02 (3d
ed. 2005).
56
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
57
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
58
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
59
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (“This subdivision is
intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action
with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding
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members are claiming that the defendant has wronged them in
a common way. 60
In determining if a class meets the requirements of Rule
23 for certification, courts are split as to how they should
evaluate the class’s allegations. In General Telephone. Co. of
the Southwest v. Falcon, 61 the Supreme Court held that courts
should perform a “rigorous analysis” to ensure that a class
meets each of the requirements of Rule 23(a). 62 In an earlier
decision, though, the Court held in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin 63 that a judge cannot go so far as to “conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.” 64 It
has been noted, though, that judges apply this holding
inconsistently. 65 Since Falcon, courts have had a difficult time
finding a middle ground between Eisen and Falcon. 66 One
court went so far as to require a party seeking to certify a class
to show “under a strict burden of proof, that all requirements of
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23(a) are clearly met.” 67
B.

Commonality

The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is meant
to ensure that all potential class members have their case
adequately heard when joinder of all plaintiffs would be
“impracticable.” 68 In determining whether a particular class
declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a
whole, is appropriate . . . . Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose
members are incapable of specific enumeration.”).
60
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
61
457 U.S. 147 (1982).
62
Id. at 161.
63
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
64
Id. at 177.
65
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254 (2002). In fact, Bone and Evans argue that rather than
apply the requirements of Rule 23, judges decide certification based on “the value of the
class action” and that “[j]udges seem more willing to overlook evidentiary weaknesses
and certify a class the more strongly they believe in the importance of the class action
for enforcement of the substantive law.” Id. at 1272.
66
“We have noted that the ‘boundary between a class determination and the
merits may not always be easily discernible.’” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of
Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Eggleston v. Chicago Journeyman
Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981)).
67
Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Rex v.
Owens ex rel. Okla., 585 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1978)).
68
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
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meets this requirement, the Supreme Court directed lower
courts to focus on whether there are common facts and legal
A class can satisfy this
issues among class members. 69
requirement by sharing only one common legal issue or fact. 70
Courts have acknowledged that class action cases
concerning sexual discrimination in the employment context
generally meet the commonality requirement when decisions
regarding employment are centralized to a particular place or
within a particular group. 71 In Dean v. Boeing Co., the plaintiff
sued Boeing on behalf of female employees at a limited number
of plants in the United States. 72 The District Court of Kansas
held that the commonality requirement was met in part
because there was a common question of law or fact to all
plaintiffs in that all of the women worked at Boeing’s Kansas
operations. 73 Likewise, in Penk v. Oregon State Board of
Higher Education, 74 the proposed class consisted of “all women
faculty members who have taught or are teaching at Oregon’s
Given the
eight institutions of higher education . . . .” 75
centralized nature of a public school system, the District Court
of Oregon found that “the Board, [and] not each individual
institution, assure[s] compliance with Oregon’s law against
educational discrimination.” 76
On the other hand, when the decision-making process is
decentralized or stratified, courts tend to find that
commonality does not exist because the employees are dealt
with on a more local level, rather than by a corporate parent.
In Droughn v. FMC Corp., 77 the defendant comprised three
different areas of employment, each engaged in distinct tasks,
69

See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.23 (3d

ed. 2005).
70

Id.
See Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 267 (D. Md. 2004) (stating that
finding commonality is more prevalent in an employment discrimination lawsuit when,
“the alleged pattern or practice was sufficiently centralized and defined so as to
eliminate the need for individualized inquiries on liability.”). The court cited cases
where commonality existed when there was a centralized decision-making process in a
single location or evidence of a corporate wide policy of discrimination. See, e.g.,
Newsome v. Up-To-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 361-62 (D. Md. 2004); Hewlett
v. Premier Salons Int’l, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 211, 216-17 (D. Md. 1997).
72
Dean v. Boeing Co., No. 02-1019-WEB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8787, at *4
(D. Kan., Apr. 24, 2003).
73
Id. at *47.
74
Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 93 F.R.D. 45 (D. Or. 1981).
75
Id. at 48.
76
Id. at 50.
77
Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
71
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with 48,000 employees across thirty-two states and thirteen
countries. 78 FMC employees alleged that FMC engaged in
sexual and racial discrimination. 79 The Eastern District Court
of Pennsylvania held that the proposed class could not be
certified, because “FMC, consistent with its structurally
diverse and geographically widespread organization, has
adopted a decentralized approach to personnel practices. Not
only is there no evidence of employment practices emanating
from national corporate headquarters, but there is also nothing
to suggest that the Chemical Group maintains a firm grip on
employment policy within different segments of the division.” 80
Similarly, in Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 81 the District Court of
Maryland rejected plaintiffs’ class, because no “cohesive
pattern” of discrimination existed to find that the class
satisfied the commonality requirement. 82 By highlighting the
stratified nature of these company’s employment practices,
these courts show that maintaining a practice of making
employment decisions at the local level is a legitimate defense
for a corporate parent.
C.

Typicality

When evaluating whether or not a class has met the
typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), 83 courts often note that
“[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)
tend to merge,” 84 because “[b]oth serve as guideposts for
determining whether under the particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated
78

Id. at 641.
Id.
80
Id. at 642.
81
222 F.R.D. 260 (D. Md. 2004).
82
Id. at 267. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the Talley case.
83
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
84
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982).
See also Rowe v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 01-6965, 2003 U.S. District LEXIS
19561, at *17 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 30, 2003); Campos v. INS, 188 F.R.D. 656, 659 (S.D.
Fla. 1999); Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 82, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1989);
Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1271, 1273-74 (N.D. Ohio 1986). All of
these cases cite Falcon for the proposition that the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23 “tend to merge.”
79
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that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
adequately protected in their absence.” 85 However, this is not
to say that courts do not evaluate typicality independently or
that the typicality requirement does not have its own set of
criteria. 86 When evaluating typicality, courts look to see
whether “other members of the class . . . have the same or
similar grievances as the plaintiff.” 87 Put otherwise, “the
typicality requirement assesses the sufficiency of the named
plaintiff.” 88 By focusing on the plaintiff’s claims, courts can
discern between claims that have a common basis from those
that require an individual evaluation, and therefore, are
inappropriate for class action status.
Historically, courts have held that “across-the-board”
employment class action lawsuits fulfilled the typicality
requirement of Rule 23. 89 “Across-the-board” class action
lawsuits consist of claims by a group of people that a systemwide policy of discrimination exists, and that the entire system
must be challenged and not an individual part of it. 90 This
means that a representative plaintiff could bring a class action
lawsuit implicating an employer’s discriminatory practice, even
if the representative plaintiff was only affected by one instance
of such practice. 91 However, in Falcon, the Supreme Court
rendered “across-the-board” employment discrimination
lawsuits obsolete “by insisting on actual, not presumed,
compliance with the typicality . . . provisions of Rule 23.” 92 In

85

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13.
But it is true that some courts view the typicality requirement as being
redundant. See, e.g., Bullock v. Bd. of Ed. of Montgomery County, 210 F.R.D. 556, 560
(D. Md. 2002) (stating that the typicality requirement “has been observed to be a
redundant criterion.”).
87
Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 (8th Cir. 1982). See Carpe
v. Aquila, Inc., No. 02-0388-CV-W-FJG, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21590, at *6 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 13, 2004); Evans v. Am. Credit Sys., 222 F.R.D. 388, 394 (D. Neb. 2004); Bullock
v. Bd. of Ed. of Montgomery County, 210 F.R.D. 556, 560 (D. Md. 2002).
88
In re Chrysler Corp. Paint Litig., No. 1239, 2000 U.S. District LEXIS 2332,
at *16 (E.D. Pa. March 2, 2000).
89
Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 643, 648 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (discussing the history of across the board employment lawsuits).
90
See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir.
1969) (reversing the lower court’s decision to narrow the scope of the case because even
though different facts and circumstances applied to different employees, the named
plaintiff challenged system-wide discrimination on behalf of all African-American
workers.).
91
Miller, 89 F. Supp. at 648.
92
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d 482
U.S. 656 (1987) (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)).
86
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distinguishing between an individual’s claim of discrimination
and classwide discrimination, the Court stated:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim
that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and
his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy
of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who
have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the
individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims. For [plaintiff] to
bridge the gap, he must prove much more than the validity of his
own claim. 93

Ultimately, for a class to meet the typicality
requirement, the court must determine that the potential class
members’ interests are “fairly encompassed” with the named
plaintiffs’ interests. 94
Turning to post-Falcon class actions in the employment
context, courts have found that an employment class has
fulfilled the typicality requirement of Rule 23 when the
discrimination emanated from a “centrally administered
policy.” 95 This is demonstrated in Mathers v. Northshore
Mining Co., 96 where the District Court of Minnesota held that a
group of women who “work[ed] in eight particular
departments” 97 met the typicality requirement. 98 By specifying
that the class members worked in a limited number of
departments within the company’s mining operation, the court
emphasized that it certified the class because of a policy
administered by the corporation. 99 It should be noted that
many courts have stated that “typicality is not demanding,” 100
and, as such, courts sometimes give little or no explanation
regarding this requirement of class certification. Additionally,
the opposing party sometimes does not attempt to challenge
the class’s assertion that it meets the typicality requirement. 101

93

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-58.
Id. at 160.
95
Resnick v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 90 F.R.D. 530, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
96
Mathers v. Northshore Mining Co., 217 F.R.D. 474 (D. Minn. 2003).
97
Id. at 486.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing James v.
City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 571 (5th Cir. 2001)). See also Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co.,
994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993)).
101
7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1764 (2d ed. 1986).
94
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Despite the low threshold that courts demand for the
typicality requirement, given the issues raised by the Court in
Falcon, courts have denied class certification based on a
classes’ inability to meet the typicality requirement. 102 As
mentioned earlier, in cases where a class did not satisfy the
typicality requirement, the representative plaintiff or plaintiffs
often had a unique claim 103 or attempted to implicate an
individual incident of discrimination as indicative of a
companywide policy of discrimination. 104 In both ARINC and
Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Medical Group, the representative
plaintiffs attempted to take their individual claims and apply
them to all members of a similarly situated group of people. 105
In Abrams, Kelsey-Seybold operated twenty outpatient clinics
in the Houston area.
The plaintiffs alleged racial
discrimination in employment decisions regarding promotions
and layoffs. 106 Although the plaintiffs reduced the class size
three times, the Southern District Court of Texas still found
that, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Falcon, the
claims were individual in nature and not applicable to the
whole class. 107
Likewise, ARINC was a government contractor with
over 3,000 employees in twenty-four states. 108 All of the
plaintiffs in the lawsuit worked either at ARINC’s
headquarters in Annapolis, Maryland or in its Washington,
D.C. office. 109 The plaintiffs attempted to represent all AfricanAmerican employees, alleging racial and sexual discrimination
in promotions and layoffs. 110 The District Court of Maryland
held, however, that the plaintiffs improperly attempted to
102
See generally ARINC, 222 F.R.D. at 268; Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Med.
Group Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116, 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
103
See Boyce v. Honeywell, 191 F.R.D. 669, 676 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (stating that
“the claims asserted by the eight named plaintiffs . . . cover a vast array of individual
circumstances” and therefore “this case does not appear to implicate a common, general
policy . . . which has a discriminatory impact on the class.”).
104
See ARINC, 222 F.R.D. at 268 (“This case does not present the factual
scenario of a discriminatory practice being applied so as to broadly discriminate
against persons in the identical manner”); Abrams, 178 F.R.D. at 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(“[I]n cases alleging classwide disparate treatment in particular employment actions,
plaintiffs must show a company-wide policy or practice, beyond individualized claims of
discrimination.”).
105
See generally ARINC, 222 F.R.D 260; Abrams, 178 F.R.D. 116.
106
Kelsey-Seybold Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D. at 119.
107
Id. at 129.
108
ARINC, 222 F.R.D. at 263.
109
Id. at 265.
110
Id. at 263.
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combine several individual claims of sexual and racial
discrimination, when in reality, each plaintiff’s claim required
individualized proof. 111
III.

THE COURT’S DECISION IN DUKES V. WAL-MART

A.

The Finding of Commonality

As discussed above, commonality focuses on whether
there are common facts and legal issues among class
members. 112 In Dukes, the court held that commonality existed
between the class representatives and the potential class
members because they all suffered from the same subjective
corporate policies regarding compensation and promotion. 113
The class representatives presented three types of evidence to
prove this allegation. 114 First, they pointed to Wal-Mart’s
“excessive[ly] subjectiv[e]” 115 policies regarding compensation
and promotions. 116 Second, they offered “expert statistical
evidence” 117 which demonstrated a connection between gender
disparities and discrimination. 118 Finally, they presented the
court with “anecdotal evidence” 119 regarding management’s
tolerance for or promulgation of discrimination. 120 The court
stated that considered together, “this evidence more than
satisfies plaintiffs’ burden” 121 in meeting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23’s commonality requirement.
Notwithstanding the court’s holding, the plaintiffs failed
to meet the commonality criteria.
Just because class
representatives worked for the same corporation as potential
class members, it does not follow that they all suffered from a
common policy of discrimination.
As discussed earlier,
plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart policies prevented them from
receiving promotions and that Wal-Mart awarded greater
compensation for men who performed the same tasks as
111
112

Id. at 268.
See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.23 (3d ed.

1999).
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145.
Id.
Id.
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women. 122 There is a significant difference, though, between an
individual
allegedly
suffering
from
corporate-wide
discrimination in promotion and pay practices and a group of
people all suffering from the same injury such that there are
common questions of law and fact pertaining to all of the
plaintiffs. 123
This idea is especially apparent in a corporation like
Wal-Mart, “the largest employer in the world,” 124 because it
would be very difficult for an employee in Maine, for example,
to suffer from the same discrimination as an employee in
Oregon. Wal-Mart utilizes a tiered managerial system, 125
which makes it virtually impossible for corporate headquarters
to control decisions made at the local level. 126 Individual WalMart store managers are solely responsible for setting
compensation levels for hourly positions and “are granted
substantial discretion in making salary decisions.” 127 In fact, in
McCree v. Sam’s Club, 128 which involved Sam’s Club, one of the
four types of Wal-Mart stores, 129 the Middle District Court of
Alabama recognized Sam’s Club’s policy whereby store
managers determined the eligibility criteria for Sam’s Clubs’
management training program. 130 In deciding whether the
plaintiffs could show that this policy was discriminatory, the
court stated, “Plaintiffs do not attempt to show that this policy
is in itself . . . discriminatory, but merely argue that it must
allow for discriminatory practices by local stores because of the
raw statistics furnished. Such speculation does not satisfy the
court that this case is an appropriate one for class action.” 131
On the contrary, the Dukes court certified the class relying on
122

See generally supra Part II.
Hart, supra note 52, at 819 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, at 157 (1982)).
124
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141.
125
Id. at 146. At the bottom of the managerial system are assistant managers
and specialty department managers. Id. These managers report to the store manager,
who in turn reports to the district manager. Id. at 145. Wal-Mart operates four
different types of stores and all stores are divided into seven divisions. Id. at 145.
Each division is divided into regions, for a total of 41 regions nationwide, with each
region containing roughly 80-85 stores. Id. This results in a total of almost 3,500
stores. Id.
126
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 4, Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
127
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 146.
128
McCree v. Sam’s Club, 159 F.R.D. 572 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
129
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141 n.1.
130
See McCree, 159 F.R.D. at 577.
131
Id.
123
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statistics regarding the percentage of women who held hourly
positions versus the percentage of women who held salaried
positions, as well as statistical evidence of discrimination and
statistical evidence regarding compensation. 132 It is surprising,
therefore, that the Dukes court did not follow the court’s
decision in McCree and deny certification based on a lack of
evidence of a national policy of discrimination at Wal-Mart.
Another way that courts have described the
commonality requirement is that all of the plaintiffs must
suffer from a common policy which results in a common
injury. 133 In cases where courts certified a class in an “acrossthe-board” case, plaintiffs all suffered from the same policy and
suffered a common injury. 134 An example of this is found in
Newsome v. Up-to-Date Laundry. Plaintiffs, were denied the
opportunity to work overtime and received less pay. 135
Although no explicit policy forbidding African-Americans from
working overtime existed, defendants openly used racial slurs,
and plaintiffs presented statistical evidence that they were
subject to less favorable conditions and terms than other
workers. 136 In effect, the plaintiffs suffered from an unspoken
policy that amounted to racial discrimination. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Newsome, who suffered from a common policy, the
Dukes plaintiffs cannot point to a Wal-Mart policy, latent or
overt, that encourages sexual discrimination. Plaintiffs in
Dukes rely on the argument that Wal-Mart’s policies contained
“excessive subjectivity,” which, in effect, led to sexual
discrimination. 137 However, the Ninth Circuit held in Coleman,
that “subjective evaluations are not unlawful per se and their
relevance to proof of discriminatory intent is weak.” 138
Other courts have also held that when promotion
decisions were made on a local level, the parent company was

132

Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 146, 154-56.
See Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 268 (N.D. Md. 2004) (stating
that for a class to be certified it must “present the factual scenario of a discriminatory
practice being applied so as to broadly discriminate against persons in the identical
manner.”).
134
See, e.g., Newsome v. Up-to-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 361-62
(N.D. Md. 2004); Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Co., 217 F.R.D. 178, 187 (D. Md.
2003); Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int’l, 185 F.R.D. 211, 216-17 (D.C. Md. 2003).
135
Newsome, 219 F.R.D. at 360.
136
See id.
137
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151.
138
Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)).
133
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not liable and the class was not certified. 139 In those cases, the
courts held that although corporate headquarters determined
hiring and promotion guidelines, because local managers
implemented those policies, “the circumstances of each
proposed class representative’s case will depend on how a
specific manager treated that proposed class representative at
his or her store.” 140 Plaintiffs’ attempt to hold Wal-Mart
responsible for decisions made on a local level is misguided
because district managers had the ability to oversee pay and
promotion decisions made by store managers, 141 and therefore,
they should be held responsible for any sexual discrimination,
not corporate headquarters.
The court in Dukes further emphasized that the
“subjective manner” in which store managers made hiring and
promotion decisions militated for class certification. 142 The
court pointed to the “considerable discretion” 143 given to store
managers to make those decisions and the fact that this
discretion was “deliberate and routine,” 144 which made WalMart “susceptible to being infected by discriminatory
animus.” 145 In describing Wal-Mart’s employment practices as
discriminatory, 146 the court neglected to discuss Reid v.
In Reid, plaintiffs sued
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. 147
Lockheed Martin on behalf of African-American employees
working in facilities across the country, claiming that the
139
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619,
682 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 670
(N.D. Ga. 2001); Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 567 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
140
Rhodes, 213 F.R.D. at 676 (stating that “[s]everal other courts have found
that the commonality requirement is not satisfied where geographic diversity or an
absence of centralized decision-making exists, or where different decision-makers made
the challenged decisions”). See also Donaldson, 205 F.R.D. at 567; Reid, 205 F.R.D. at
669; Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1999)
(stating, “[t]he fact that [employment] decisions are handled by one’s immediate
supervisor based on subjective criteria would be useful evidence in an individual
disparate treatment claim, but works against class certification of a disparate impact
claim when the proposed class is subject to the same local autonomy in geographically
dispersed facilities.”).
141
See Def’s Opp. to Class Certification, at 14-15, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
142
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145.
143
Id. at 153.
144
Id. at 149.
145
Id.
146
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988);
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); Casillas v.
United States Navy, 735 F.2d 338, 345 (9th Cir. 1984) (cases where courts rejected
plaintiffs’ attempts to attack employment practices as discriminatory).
147
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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company engaged in racial discrimination by allowing facility
managers to use subjective criteria when making employment
The Northern District of Georgia denied
decisions. 148
certification, because the Reid plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in
Dukes, had essentially claimed that Lockheed Martin had a
“centralized policy of decentralization” 149 under which facility
managers had the autonomy to use subjective criteria when
making employment decisions. 150 The court held that this is an
insufficient basis to maintain a multi-facility class action
lawsuit because “Title VII prohibits discriminatory
employment
practices,
not
an
abstract
policy
of
151
Reid and Dukes are factually and legally
discrimination.”
analogous: both involve an abstract claim of discrimination
whereby the plaintiffs attempted to hold a corporate parent
liable, when in reality, no substantive corporate policy existed
that could implicate the corporate parent.
Furthermore, Dukes cited Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
152
Trust as proof that subjective decision-making is a basis for
class certification when the factual scenario in Watson should
have led the Dukes court to the exact opposite conclusion. 153 In
Watson, a woman sued an individual bank for racial
discrimination on the grounds that the bank used subjective
criteria in its employment decisions that led to
discrimination. 154 A key fact in Watson, which the Dukes court
failed to mention, was that Watson did not involve a class
action lawsuit. Apart from this, the Reid court emphasized the
fact that claims of subjective decision-making give rise to
individual claims, and not class action lawsuits. 155 The Dukes
148

Id. at 657-59.
Id. at 670.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 670 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159
n.15 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original)).
152
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
153
See Dukes at 149.
154
See id. at 977.
155
See Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 670 (stating that using subjective criteria “does not
mean that subjective employment practices necessarily give rise to a broad, multifacility class; rather, it leads to the opposite conclusion.”). The Reid court cited a
number of cases where other courts emphasized this point. See, e.g., Stastny v. S. Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that “evidence of subjectivity
in employment decisions may well serve to bolster proof on the merits of individual
claims of disparate treatment . . . it cuts against any inference for class action
commonality purposes that local facility practices were imposed or enforced state-wide
with respect to a statewide class”); Zachery v. Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D.
230, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that “[t]he fact that [employment] decisions are
149
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court, therefore, incorrectly cited Watson and the proposition
that it stands for – that claims of subjective decision-making
are appropriate in cases involving a single facility or location
and not multi-facility – to support “across-the-board” class
action lawsuits.
Although the Dukes court held that a subjective
decision-making process could serve as a basis for a
discrimination claim, there are cases where courts rejected the
use of this argument even when the case involved an individual
plaintiff. In Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., the Ninth
Circuit rejected the claim that subjective decision-making alone
can be used to prove discrimination. 156 In Sengupta, the
plaintiff claimed that Morrison-Knudsen utilized subjective
criteria in its employee evaluations, which led to racial
discrimination and plaintiff’s discharge. 157 In dismissing the
plaintiff’s claim, the court in Sengupta held that subjectivity is
not grounds for proving discrimination, because “[its] relevance
to proof of a discriminatory intent is weak.” 158 Furthermore, in
Casillas v. United States Navy, the plaintiff claimed that the
Navy used subjective decision-making practices as a cover for
national origin discrimination and that the Navy used these
practices to prevent his promotion. 159 The Ninth Circuit flatly
rejected plaintiff’s claim, stating that “[w]e have explicitly
rejected the idea that an employer’s use of subjective
employment criteria has a talismanic significance.” 160
As the final basis for deciding that the plaintiffs fulfilled
the commonality requirement of Rule 23, the Dukes court noted
Wal-Mart’s
“strong . . . distinctive,
centrally
controlled,
161
The court claimed that this strong
corporate culture.”
corporate culture led to “uniformity of operational and
personnel practices,” 162 and that these practices “[include]

handled by one’s immediate supervisor based on subjective criteria would be useful
evidence in an individual disparate treatment claim, but works against class
certification of a disparate impact claim when the proposed class is subject to the same
local autonomy in geographically dispersed facilities”) (emphasis in original).
156
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).
(stating “[t]he use of subjective employment criteria is not unlawful per se” and “their
relevance to proof of a discriminatory intent is weak.”).
157
Id. at 1073-75.
158
Id. at 1075.
159
Casillas v. United States Navy, 735 F.2d 338, 340-42 (9th Cir. 1984).
160
Id. at 345.
161
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
162
Id.
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gender stereotyping.” 163 There is an inherent tension, though,
with claiming, on the one hand, that the decision-making
process at Wal-Mart is subjective, and on the other hand, that
a strong corporate culture existed at Wal-Mart that led to a
“uniformity of operational and personnel practices.” 164 The
court even acknowledged this contradiction, 165 but attempted to
reconcile it by holding that the subjective decision-making on
the local level allows gender bias to become a common part of
the Wal-Mart system. 166 This holding was in direct contrast
with the Reid court’s more reasonable summary of similar
plaintiffs’ arguments, in which it was observed that, “[t]he best
characterization of Plaintiffs’ theory is that Defendants had a
centralized policy of decentralization, which is insufficient on
these facts to satisfy commonality . . . with respect to Plaintiffs’
proposed multi-facility cases.” 167 In certifying the class, the
Dukes court effectively acknowledged that subjective decisionmaking practices are not grounds for a class action lawsuit,
and used animus against Wal-Mart’s “strong corporate culture”
as a way of glossing over the legal gaps in the court’s
reasoning. 168
B.

The Typicality Finding

Turning to Rule 23’s typicality requirement, the Dukes
court found that, although the plaintiffs worked in Wal-Mart
stores across the country, they fulfilled this requirement
because they were subject to “excessively subjective decisionmaking in a corporate culture of uniformity and gender
stereotyping.” 169 In other words, even though one plaintiff
worked in a store in New York and another in a store in
163

Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
165
“The Court recognizes that there is a tension inherent in characterizing a
system as having both excessive subjectivity at the local level and centralized control.”
Id. at 152.
166
Id.
167
Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 670.
168
There are numerous websites whose sole purpose is to portray Wal-Mart as
an evil corporate giant. See, e.g., Walmart Sucks, http://www.walmartsucks.org (last
visited Dec. 30, 2004); Walmart Blows, http://www.walmart-blows.com (last visited Oct.
15, 2005); Walmart Watch, http://www.walmartwatch.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2004).
Cities have also gone on the offense against Wal-Mart by passing zoning laws that
prevent “big box” stores such as Wal-Mart from opening. See, e.g., Wake-Up Wal-Mart,
Zoning changes prohibit big-box stores, at http://wakeupwalmart.com/news/20050527tcre.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
169
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167.
164
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California, both suffered from a “common practice,” 170 and
thereby fulfilled Rule 23’s requirement that “claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class.” 171
A problem with the Dukes court’s decision regarding
typicality is that, on the one hand, it held that the named
representatives and all possible plaintiffs suffered from typical
claims, but on the other hand, acknowledged that the claims
are “individual-specific.” 172 This leads to a serious problem: if
the plaintiffs’ claims were “individual-specific,” then the court
will have to examine each plaintiff’s claim, which defeats the
purpose of a class action lawsuit. 173 Courts have routinely
denied class certification where the court deemed necessary a
review of each plaintiff’s individual claims. 174 Moreover, the
court in Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Medical Group, Inc., went as
far as to say that “[a] class may not be based on discrimination
occurring in different departments, involving different decision
makers.” 175
While the representative plaintiffs could conceivably
bring a claim against their individual store managers, or even
possibly against all Wal-Mart stores in California, “the
consensus among other courts . . . is that a plaintiff may
represent a multi-facility class only when centralized and
uniform employment practices affect all facilities in the same

170

Id. at 167-68.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
172
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167. In acknowledging defendant’s objection based on
the individual-specific nature of the plaintiffs’ claim, the court responded that “[s]ome
degree of individualized specificity must be expected in all cases.” Id.
173
See Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619, 682
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (in discussing one reason for not certifying the class, the court stated
that “the proposed class representatives’ and members’ disparate treatment claims will
require individualized factual determinations. Plaintiffs consequently cannot satisfy
the typicality requirement with respect to their disparate treatment claims.”).
174
See id. (concluding its analysis of the typicality requirement by stating that
“Plaintiffs consequently cannot satisfy the typicality requirement with respect to their
disparate treatment claims.”). See also Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D.
Md. 2004) (“Plaintiffs have aggregated several individual complaints that require
individualized proof and give rise to individualized defenses . . . . This case does not
present the factual scenario of a discriminatory practice being applied so as to broadly
discriminate against persons in the identical manner.”); Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold
Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116, 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“[T]he courts have made it clear
that in cases alleging classwide disparate treatment in particular employment actions,
plaintiffs must show a company-wide policy or practice, beyond individualized claims of
discrimination.”).
175
Abrams, 178 F.R.D. at 129.
171
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way.” 176 In situations where “employment practices were set by
a plant manager located at each [division] facility . . . the court
held
that
the
plaintiffs
could
only
represent
those . . . employees employed at the first facility, and it
excluded . . . those . . . employees that worked at the other
three facilities.” 177
As mentioned earlier, the situation in Reid is extremely
similar to the situation in Dukes whereby plaintiffs attempted
to represent class members at several locations in several
different states. 178 In Reid, the court denied the plaintiffs’
motion for class certification, because each plant determined
employment practices and, in a multi-facility case, a plaintiff
can only represent workers from his own facility, unless
centralized policies existed. 179 It would only seem logical,
therefore, that in a case like Dukes, which involves over 3,400
stores and in which each store manager had “substantial
discretion” 180 regarding employment decisions, that the court
should have denied class certification as well. This assertion is
further bolstered by the court’s decision in ARINC, where the
court held that “[a] class may not be based on discrimination
occurring in different departments, involving different decision
Surely, if a class cannot be certified when
makers.” 181
discrimination occurs in different departments, then a class
cannot be certified when discrimination allegedly occurred in
over 3,400 stores across the country. Accordingly, the Dukes
court erroneously and without reason ignored the rulings of its
sister courts.
In order for a class to satisfy the typicality requirement,
the named plaintiffs must represent the interests of all other
potential plaintiffs. 182 Whereas the Dukes court cited cases that
have allowed different types of plaintiffs to represent an entire
class, 183 the Dukes case is in fact different from those cases.

176
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 667-68 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (emphasis added).
177
Id. (citing Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 78 F.R.D. 645, 651 (E.D. Pa.
1978)).
178
Id. at 659.
179
See id. at 669.
180
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
181
Abrams, 178 F.R.D. at 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
182
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
183
See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Meyer v.
MacMillan Publ’g Co., 95 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Taylor v. Union Carbide
Corp., 93 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D. W. Va. 1980).
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The plaintiffs’ class in Dukes is composed of hourly and
salaried employees, even though the hourly employees’ case is
based on discrimination allegedly perpetrated by the salaried
mangers. 184 In other cases where the plaintiffs sought to be
certified as a class comprised of members with competing
interests, the courts have held that the competing class
members could not be in the same class. 185
Another issue raised during the court’s discussion of
typicality in Dukes is whether the class representatives could
represent the entire class even though only one of the
representatives held a managerial position in a Sam’s Club
store. 186 The plaintiffs arranged their class so that Christine
Kwapnoski, the only plaintiff to have held a managerial
position, represented other managers, even though she only
held an entry-level managerial position at a Sam’s Club. 187 The
Dukes court asserted that it is irrelevant whether or not there
is a representative for each level of management, 188 and
specifically that Kwapnoski, as an entry-level manager, 189 was
not a member of upper management. 190 Other courts have said
that if there are conflicts between different managerial
positions, then one manager cannot represent a different
managerial position. 191 Once again, rather than apply a
“rigorous analysis” 192 to the typicality requirement of Rule 23,

184
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 34, Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (No. 01-2252).
185
See id. (citing Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 568 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (denying class certification and holding that “[a] conflict of interest may
arise where a class contains both supervisory and non-supervisory employees.”));
Appleton v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 168 F.R.D. 221, 233 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)
(preventing plaintiffs from representing class members, the court stated, “members of
the proposed class who are supervisors have likely been responsible for evaluating the
performances of other members of the class – evaluations these nonsupervisory
personnel may challenge as discriminatory.”).
186
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166.
187
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 17-18 n.9, Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (No. 01-2252).
188
See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Union
Carbide Corp., 93 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D. W. Va. 1980).
189
See supra note 29.
190
Id. at 166-67.
191
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 34 (citing Clayborne v.
Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 587-88, 597-98 (D. Neb. 2002)); Morgan v.
United Parcel Serv. of Am., 169 F.R.D. 349, 357-58 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that center
managers could not adequately represent higher-level managerial employees due to
potential conflicts of interest).
192
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15 (1982); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253
F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).
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the court chose to emphasize the “permissive” 193 nature of the
typicality requirement. The court failed to recognize that while
class actions should be certified when appropriate, the Court in
Falcon demanded “rigorous analysis” 194 of all applications for
class action status because class action lawsuits are “an
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and
on behalf of the individual named parties only.” 195
In sum, the Dukes court found a basis for holding that
the plaintiffs met the commonality and typicality requirements
of Rule 23 based on the “broad discretion to determine whether
a class should be certified” 196 and the “permissive” 197 nature of
the typicality requirement.
IV.

THE COURT’S USE OF EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE LACK
OF A DAUBERT ANALYSIS

Courts rely on expert witnesses to determine if the
assertions made by plaintiffs seeking class action status are
accurate. 198 Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 govern the
admissibility of expert witness testimony. 199 In Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs claimed that their
children were born with birth defects as a result of a drug

193
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167 (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957
(9th Cir. 2003)).
194
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15; Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.
195
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 70001 (1979)).
196
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871
n.28 (9th Cir. 2001).
197
See id. at 167 (citing Staton, 327 F.3d at 957).
198
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (citing FED.
R. EVID. 702) (“‘If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue’ an expert ‘may
testify thereto.’”) (emphasis in original); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Between “Merit
Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal
Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2004).
199
See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. The Advisory Committee Notes list five factors
to determine the reliability of expert witness testimony.
(1) [W]hether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested –
that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or
theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
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manufactured by Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals. 200 Merrell Dow
challenged expert witness testimony presented by the plaintiff
regarding the link between the drug and birth defects on the
grounds that the testimony did not meet the criteria set forth
in the precedental case of Frye v. United States. 201 In Frye, the
Court held that expert witness testimony is only admissible if
the witness uses techniques that “have gained general
In Daubert,
acceptance” by the scientific community. 202
however, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702
allows judges “some gatekeeping responsibility” in admission of
expert testimony. 203 This “gatekeeping” role is meant to ensure
that expert testimony is relevant to the issue and that the
expert witness meets certain qualifications. 204 In addition to
being relevant to the issue and the expert witness being
qualified, the evidence must also assist the fact-finder. 205
In Dukes, 206 the court held a Daubert hearing regarding
the admissibility of the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert
witness relating to the presence of stereotypes and
discrimination at Wal-Mart 207 and concluded that only part of
one witness’s testimony should be stricken. 208 At the separate
hearing, the court, in stating the legal standard for reviewing
expert witness testimony at the class certification stage, held
“‘that a lower Daubert standard should be employed at this
[class certification] stage of the proceedings.’” 209 The plaintiffs
relied on three expert witnesses in order to prove that gender
The
stereotyping and disparities exist at Wal-Mart. 210
testimony of one of the expert witnesses, Dr. Bielby, a
sociologist, is especially troubling for a number of reasons. Dr.
200

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
202
Id. at 1014.
203
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n. 7 (quoting Rehnquist’s opinion, concurring in
part, dissenting in part, id. at 600).
204
Id. at 589. The Supreme Court clarified this requirement to apply to all
expert witnesses and not testimony just based on science. See Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999).
205
See FED. R. EVID. 702.
206
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
207
Id. at 191-93.
208
Id. at 195 (excluding part of the evidence submitted by Dr. Richard Drogin
because he made an error in his mathematical computations).
209
Id. at 191 (quoting Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc., v. Newport
Adhesives & Composites, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
210
See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153-56. More specifically, the court used the
expert witness’s testimony to conclude that the plaintiffs met the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). Id. at 166.
201
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Bielby assessed various Wal-Mart policies based on “subjective
belief[s],” 211 rather than “the methods and procedures of
science.” 212 In looking at various Wal-Mart policies, Dr. Bielby
concluded that “managers make decisions with considerable
discretion and little oversight” 213 and “that subjective decisions
such as these, as well as discretionary wage decisions are likely
to be biased ‘unless they are assessed . . . with clear criteria
and careful attention to the integrity of the decision-making
process.’” 214 Dr. Bielby based his opinion on what the court
termed “social science research.” 215
In turning to the issue of social science research, other
social scientists have reached the exact opposite conclusion
than that of Dr. Bielby, though Wal-Mart surprisingly did not
use this evidence in its case. 216 One group of researchers found
that the “distinction between [an] ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
[evaluative] measurement is neither meaningful nor useful in
human performance.” 217 Another group of researchers found
that “the distinction between subjective and objective is
problematic and somewhat arbitrary.” 218 The most persuasive
statement against Dr. Bielby, though, is that of the Dukes court
itself. In addressing the defendant’s objections to Dr. Bielby’s
testimony, the court stated:
Defendant also challenges Dr. Bielby’s opinions as unfounded and
imprecise. It is true that Dr. Bielby’s opinions have a built-in degree
of conjecture. He does not present a quantifiable analysis; rather, he
combines the understanding of the scientific community with
evidence of Defendant’s policies and practices, and concludes that
Wal-Mart is “vulnerable” to gender bias. Defendant rightly points
out that Dr. Bielby cannot definitively state how regularly
stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment decisions at WalMart. 219

211
212
213
214
215
216

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
Id.
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153 (citing Bielby Decl. ¶¶ 37-41).
Id. (quoting Bielby Decl. at ¶ 39).
Id.
See David Copus, Beware the Power of Junk Science, 177 N.J.L.J. 764

(2004).
217
Fredrick Muckler & Sally A. Seven, Selecting Performance Measures:
‘Objective’ versus ‘Subjective’ Measurement, 34 HUMAN FACTORS 441 (1992).
218
J. Kevin Ford et al., Study of Race Effects in Objective Indices and
Subjective Evaluations of Performance: A Meta-Analysis of Performance Criteria, 99
PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 331 (1986).
219
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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This statement indicates that Dr. Bielby’s testimony
should fail under the Daubert analysis because it was based on
“subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” 220 Amazingly,
however, at the special hearing, the Dukes court decided that
Dr. Bielby’s testimony “[was] sufficiently probative to assist the
Court in evaluating the class certification requirements at
issue in this case.” 221
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited previous cases
where the court admitted expert witness testimony, even
though the testimony could not definitively state a
conclusion. 222 A majority of the cases relied on by the court
dealt with a single employee or a group of employees suing an
employer and not a class action lawsuit. 223 Taking into account
the fact that class action lawsuits are the exception to the
rule, 224 the court should have rejected Dr. Bielby’s testimony on
account of its “built-in degree of conjecture,” 225 and the fact that
it resembles “junk science” 226 and not “scientifically valid
principles.” 227
V.

THE COURT’S DECISION REGARDING TITLE VII ISSUES

Congress amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
As part of the amendment, Congress granted victims
of alleged intentional discrimination the right to seek
Whatever the
compensatory and punitive damages. 229
intentions of Congress, the 1991 Amendment created
228

220

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (1993).
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 192.
222
Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989); Costa
v. Desert Palace Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 861 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
223
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 192. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Butler
v. Home Depot, Inc. to show that courts have admitted expert witness testimony based
on social science) (citations omitted).
224
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
225
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154 (citing Bielby Decl. ¶63). “Conjecture” is defined
by Merriam-Webster’s On-Line dictionary as an “inference from defective or
presumptive evidence” or “a conclusion deduced by surmise or guesswork.” MerriamWebster’s On-Line, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=
Dictionary&va=conjecture (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
226
Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996).
227
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
[hereinafter Daubert II]. See also Chamblee, supra note 198, at 1048 (stating that
courts normally use a low threshold when deciding on class certification, but that “they
should use a higher standard to filter unreliable evidence.”).
228
See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1991).
229
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1991).
221
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significant difficulties for plaintiffs involved in a class action
employment discrimination lawsuit seeking compensatory
and/or punitive damages. 230 As stated in Rule 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs who seek class
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), can do so only if they
are seeking “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole.” 231
These competing provisions result in a difficult situation
for classes seeking to be certified while also requesting
monetary damages. As a result, the Advisory Committee for
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in looking at the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 in conjunction with Rule 23(b)(2), stated
that class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) “does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominantly to monetary damages.” 232 Despite
this explicit warning, the Dukes court overlooked possible Title
VII issues and permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their
claims. 233 In fact, the court concluded that it had “little
difficulty” 234 holding that the equitable relief predominated over
the monetary relief sought. 235
This result is surprising given the outcome in Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp. which some have described as “[t]he
best-known articulation” 236 regarding employment class actions
following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In
Allison, plaintiffs sued Citgo Petroleum Corporation, claiming
that the supervisors at one plant engaged in racial
discrimination in their employment decisions. 237 The Fifth
230

See Hart, supra note 52, at 813.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
232
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (emphasis added).
233
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
234
Id. at 171.
235
Id. The court’s conclusion is even more surprising, because the court relied
on Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1028 (E.D. Tex. 1982). It would appear that the
court incorrectly relied on this decision given that there is a more recent case which
dealt with the Civil Rights Amendment of 1991. Young was decided before Congress
passed The Civil Rights Act of 1991. Although the Dukes plaintiffs seek injunctive and
declaratory relief, they also seek monetary damages, a remedy unavailable in Young.
The Dukes court, therefore, should have relied on cases after 1991 in order to
determine if the injunctive and declaratory relief outweighed the monetary relief
sought by the plaintiffs. See infra note 141 for post-1991 cases involving the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Once again, it would appear that the Dukes court went to great
lengths to certify this class, despite clear case precedent that would appear to point to
the opposite result.
236
Hart, supra note 52, at 821-22.
237
See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998).
231
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Circuit denied class certification because the monetary
damages sought by the plaintiffs “[were] not incidental” 238 to
the injunctive or declaratory relief being sought. 239 As a basis
for its holding, the court wrote that
The underlying premise of the [23](b)(2) class – that its members
suffer from a common injury properly addressed by class-wide relief
– “begins to break down when the class seeks to recover back pay or
other forms of monetary relief to be allocated based on individual
injuries.” Thus, as claims for individually based money damages
begin to predominate, the presumption of cohesiveness decreases
while the need for enhanced procedural safeguards to protect
individual rights of class members increases . . . . 240

Therefore, it is difficult to understand the court’s
findings on this issue in Dukes. Even though the plaintiffs
were seeking punitive damages in the form of lost pay, 241 the
court had “little difficulty” 242 in determining that the claim for
punitive damages was incidental to the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought. This was so, despite the fact that
based on prior cases, a jury award has the potential to
bankrupt Wal-Mart. 243
The Dukes court’s stated rational for dismissing any
Title VII damages problem is a further demonstration of its
disregard for precedent and its intense desire to certify the
Dukes class. 244 In making its decision, the court in Dukes relied

238
Id. at 425. In laying the foundation for denying class certification, the
court stated:
[T]he recovery of incidental damages should typically be concomitant with,
not merely consequential to, class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.
Moreover, such damages should at least be capable of computation by means
of objective standards and not dependent in any significant way on the
intangible, subjective differences of each class member’s circumstances.
Id. at 415.
239
Id. The factual situation in Allison is quite similar to the one in Dukes.
The Allison court described the situation as follows:
[P]laintiffs seek to certify a class of a thousand potential plaintiffs spread
across two separate facilities . . . working in seven different departments,
challenging various policies and practices . . . . Some plaintiffs may have
been subjected to more virile discrimination than others: with greater public
humiliation, for longer periods of time, or based on more unjustifiable
practices, for example.
Id. at 417.
240
Id. at 413 (citations omitted).
241
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
242
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
243
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
244
The Dukes court stated that it based its findings on “ample legal
precedent.” Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The contention of this Note is
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solely on the depositions of the class representatives in
determining that the punitive damages being sought were
secondary to the equitable or injunctive relief being sought. 245
It would seem almost inconceivable that a court would rely so
heavily on the affidavits of the very people seeking class
certification in deciding whether or not to certify what would be
largest private civil rights lawsuit in United States legal
history. 246 The court in Allison spent almost ten pages 247
discussing various Title VII issues when deciding whether or
not to certify a class of “more than 1,000 potential members,” 248
a class that the court described as a “potentially huge and
wide-ranging class.” 249 The court in Dukes devoted only three
pages 250 to its discussion of any potential Title VII issues,
despite the fact that Dukes involved a “proposed class [that]
covers at least 1.5 million women” 251 which the court called
“historic in nature.” 252 The court did not discuss whether
damages would have to be determined on an individual basis or
could be calculated based on “objective standards.” 253 This
disparity is only a further indication that the Dukes court
casually dismissed significant legal issues in favor of certifying
the class.
VI.

BLACKMAIL SETTLEMENTS

The concern over blackmail settlements is an additional
policy reason for supporting the denial of class certification in a
case involving such a large number of plaintiffs and a possibly
enormous award. The idea behind a blackmail settlement is
that a class will seek to be certified in order to “coerc[e] the

that the court either misapplied legal precedent or construed it in such a way, so as to
guarantee that the class would be certified.
245
See id. at 171.
246
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
247
See Allison, 151 F.3d at 409-18.
248
Id. at 407.
249
Id.
250
See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170-72.
251
Id. at 142.
252
Id.
253
See Allison, 151 F.3d at 425. Even when other courts have certified class
actions in Title VII cases, the courts considered the approach taken in Allison. See,
e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 163-67 (2d Cir. 2001);
Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 388-89 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Faulk v. Home Oil
Co., 186 F.R.D. 660, 662-65 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
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defendant into settlement.” 254 In a speech in 1972, Judge
Henry Friendly coined the term “blackmail settlement.” 255 The
concern regarding blackmail settlements is one that many
courts and authors have recognized 256 and courts began raising
concerns surrounding blackmail settlements shortly after
Judge Friendly coined the phrase. 257 In 1998, Congress passed
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows
defendants to seek an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s
class certification. 258 The Advisory Committee Notes state that
one reason for allowing an interlocutory appeal is that “[a]n
order granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle
rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run
the risk of potentially ruinous liability.” 259 Courts have used
Rule 23(f) and the guidance provided by the Advisory
Committee notes to decertify classes when it appeared that
class certification would pressure a defendant into settling. 260
As this Note mentioned earlier, 261 the potential award in
this case could be in the billions of dollars given the fact that in
254

Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1241 n.21 (11th Cir.

2000).
255
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
256
See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); Newton
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167-69 (3d Cir. 2001);
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996). See also THOMAS E.
WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 60 (Federal
Judicial Center 1996) (in looking at class actions across four federal district courts, the
authors found that “a substantial majority of certified class actions were terminated by
class-wide settlements.”).
257
One of the earliest examples of a court discussing pressure to settle was in
Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., where the court stated: “I doubt that plaintiffs’
counsel expect the immense and unmanageable case that they seek to create to be
tried. What they seek to create will become (whether they intend this result or not) an
overwhelmingly costly and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether
just or unjust.” Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Seventh Circuit has notably been at the forefront of not certifying or decertifying
class action lawsuits because of the issue of blackmail settlements. See generally In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2002); West v. Prudential
Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995).
258
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
259
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note.
260
“The raison d’être for Rule 23(f) . . . provides a mechanism through which
appellate courts, in the interests of fairness, can restore equilibrium when a doubtful
class certification ruling would virtually compel a party to abandon a potentially
meritorious claim or defense before trial.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., v. Mowbray,
208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000).
261
See supra note 24.
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1999 a sexual discrimination lawsuit brought by 10,000
employees settled for $25 million, which means that if divided
equally, each claimant received $2,500. 262 Assuming a jury
awarded each claimant in Dukes $2,500, the total award in this
case would be $3.75 billion. Therefore, although neither the
defense nor the court in Dukes raised the issue of blackmail
settlements, it is an important issue, which should be discussed
given the magnitude of the case and possible size of the
settlement.
Although Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class [be] so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,” 263 an
excessively large class can prove to be a double-edged sword
when it comes to blackmail settlements. In Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, plaintiffs sued an accounting firm, because they
purchased securities based on a faulty prospectus certified by
the firm. 264 In denying class certification, the Supreme Court
said that “certification of a large class may so increase the
defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that
he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a
meritorious defense.” 265 Picking up on the Court’s ruling in
Livesay, the Third Circuit, in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 266 held
that where “there are hundreds of thousands of class
members,” 267 “the size of the class and number of claims may
place acute and unwarranted pressure on defendants to
settle.” 268 A number of other courts have also discussed the
problems of an excessively large class and blackmail
settlements. 269 In recognizing that the pressure to settle is
262
See id. Also see supra note 24 for an extreme example of a possible
settlement amount ($289,312,039,312); however, a settlement for such an extreme
amount would be unlikely as it would easily bankrupt Wal-Mart. A recent article
reported that Wal-Mart is seeking to settle this case, but no settlement amounts have
been made public. See Justin Scheck, Wal-Mart Said to Be in Talks to Settle Huge
Class Action, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1110202461600 (last visited
Oct.15, 2005).
263
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
264
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978).
265
Id. at 476.
266
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d
Cir. 2001).
267
Id. at 182.
268
Id. at 168 n.8.
269
See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t. Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“It may be that the aggregation in a class action of large numbers of statutory
damages claims . . . could create a potentially enormous aggregate recovery for
plaintiffs, and thus an in terrorem effect on defendants, which may induce unfair
settlements.”) (emphasis in original); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 288 F.3d at
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problematic in class action lawsuits, it is surprising, to say the
least, that neither the defense nor the court in Dukes addressed
the issue in motions filed or the opinion rendered. However, in
June 2004, the Ninth Circuit, agreed to hear an interlocutory
appeal of this case 270 pursuant to Rule 23(f), so it is possible, if
not quite likely, that the Ninth Circuit will address this issue
given the purpose of Rule 23(f) as described in the Advisory
Committee Notes. 271
VII.

A PROPOSED GUIDE FOR CERTIFYING EMPLOYMENT
CLASS ACTIONS

The guide which I propose for class certifications is
based on the holdings of other circuits. By way of a brief
outline, I propose five issues that courts should address when
deciding whether or not to certify a class. The first issue deals
with why courts should utilize a standard closer to “rigorous
analysis” 272 than to “broad discretion” 273 when deciding whether
or not to certify a class. The second issue involves whether or
not a court should hold a parent company liable for the actions
of individual managers if the individual manager is responsible
for decision-making. I identify examples of cases where
individuals brought successful and unsuccessful lawsuits
against Wal-Mart for sexual discrimination and explain why
such an avenue is more appropriate than a class action lawsuit.
Next, I recommend that courts consider the realities of
certifying a huge class in relation to the commonality
requirement. I then propose that courts carefully consider the
requirements for typicality in the context of large class action
lawsuits so as to ensure that the requirements are truly met.
Finally, I discuss the importance of considering the possible
impact that class certification can have on settlement
negotiations and the issue of blackmail settlements.

1012, 1015-16 (“Aggregating millions of claims . . . makes the case so unwieldy, and the
stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable.”).
270
Bob Egelko, Review OKd in Wal-Mart Case: Court to Rule on Class-Action
Status of Sex-Bias Lawsuit, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 2004, at A-14.
271
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note.
272
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 162 (1982); Zinser
v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 275 F.3d
1266 (9th Cir. 2001).
273
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 n.28 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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A number of courts have proposed various levels of
scrutiny when making a decision regarding class certification.
The levels range from “broad discretion,” 274 which the Dukes
court used, to “rigorous analysis,” 275 as the Supreme Court
prescribed. When deciding between these two extremes, the
Court gave lower courts guidance by stating that class action
lawsuits are “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties
only.” 276 This note proposes that, because class action lawsuits
are the exception to the rule, courts should utilize a higher
degree of scrutiny than “broad discretion.” 277 The Dukes court
tries to leave itself some breathing room by stating that it could
reconsider “certification throughout the legal proceedings
before the court.” 278 In a study sponsored by the Federal
Judicial Center, though, the Center strongly suggested that
once a court certifies a class, it is unlikely that a court will go
back and decertify it based on “traditional rulings on motions
or trials.” 279 Therefore, rather than relying on an escape hatch,
courts should acknowledge the purpose of a class action lawsuit
and rigorously analyze a motion for class certification.
In numerous cases, courts have declined to certify the
class either when a class attempted to hold a corporate parent
liable for the actions of an individual store, or when the
corporate parent had little or no control over the individual
store or unit. 280 In each of these cases, the corporation had a
policy of decentralized decision-making and the courts found
that as a result of this policy, it was inappropriate to hold the
corporate parent liable for decisions made in an individual
store. A more appropriate method of adjudication in these
types of cases is for individual plaintiffs to bring individual
lawsuits against a particular store.
Several cases exist where Wal-Mart employees
successfully sued individual stores for sexual harassment. In
274

Id.
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 162; Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.
276
Id. at 155 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
277
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 872
n.28 (9th Cir. 2001)).
278
Id.
279
See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 256, at 80.
280
See Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619 (N.D.
Ga. 2003); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001);
Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Zachery v. Texaco
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
275
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Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court consolidated thirteen
plaintiffs’ cases, all of whom alleged racial discrimination
against a single Wal-Mart store. 281 At trial, a jury found in
favor of two of the eleven plaintiffs, awarding them a total of
$375,000. 282 Of course, a number of employees’ claims failed,
but that is to be expected, just as in any other lawsuit. In
Moulds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., plaintiffs alleged racial and
The
sexual discrimination against a Wal-Mart store. 283
Eleventh Circuit found for Wal-Mart on the grounds that it had
a legitimate reason for choosing another employee for
promotion over plaintiff. 284 It is apparent, therefore, that
plaintiffs do have the ability to challenge Wal-Mart’s practices
and win, but on a scale that is far more manageable than 1.5
million women.
The numerosity requirement appears to act as a doubleedged sword. A class wants to be sufficiently large so as to
satisfy the numerosity requirement; however, if a class is too
large, there are potential issues of manageability and
commonality which could preclude certification. Many other
courts have identified class diversity as, at least, a partial
reason for denying certification. 285 As the class size gets larger,
there is less of a chance that every class member suffered from
the same discrimination. The court in Donaldson stated that
“where a putative class involves extensive diversity in terms of
geography,
job
requirements,
and/or
managerial
286
287
By tying the
responsibilities” commonality does not exist.
issue of commonality to numerosity, the Donaldson court
demonstrated that, while a large class fulfilled the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23, 288 it was ultimately class diversity that
caused the court to find that the class lacked commonality.
In the employment context, it is very difficult to fulfill
the typicality requirement, as it is nearly impossible to prove
that a large class of plaintiffs all suffered from a common policy
of discrimination. This is especially true when a corporation
uses a decentralized subjective decision-making process. If a
281

Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id.
283
Moulds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1991).
284
Id. at 256-67.
285
See Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 666; Donaldson, 205 F.R.D. at 567; Zachery, 185
F.R.D. at 239-40.
286
Donaldson, 205 F.R.D. at 567.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 565.
282
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plaintiff claims that he was subjected to discrimination on a
local level, due to subjective decision-making procedures, then
that is evidence of an “individual disparate treatment claim,” 289
but insufficient for class action status. 290 The Supreme Court
raised the legal standard by requiring “significant proof” 291 if
the subjective decision-making process is used as a basis for
class certification. 292 If courts are to certify a class based on a
claim that a corporation used subjective decision-making
procedures, then plaintiffs should either have to offer evidence
revealed during discovery or present expert witness testimony
that is scrutinized using a Daubert analysis. In this way, a
court would fulfill the directive of the Supreme Court to obtain
“significant proof” 293 of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Courts finally must acknowledge that if they certify a
large class, most plaintiffs will settle the case, rather than
leave their fate to the flip of a coin. A number of courts have
refused to certify or have even decertified a class when they
believed that certification would force the defendant to settle. 294
Courts, therefore, must ensure that the plaintiffs have viable
claims, and if they do, that the parties have exhausted all
settlement possibilities before deciding on class certification. 295
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dukes is an excellent
example of a class action certification gone wrong. In certifying
the class, the court ignored the Supreme Court’s decree that
class action lawsuits are the exception to the rule. 296 The court
mischaracterizes Wal-Mart’s intentions as trying to
“insulate” 297 itself merely because of the lawsuit’s size, when, in
289

Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at 238.
Id.
291
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15 (1982).
292
Id. See also Chamblee, supra note 198.
293
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
294
“‘Hydraulic pressure . . . to settle’ is now a recognized objection to class
certification.” Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2003) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001)).
295
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (The purpose of the Rules is “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”) Encouraging parties to settle
avoids a long, drawn-out litigation process.
296
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01
(1979)).
297
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
290
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reality, Wal-Mart’s main concern is the manageability of the
case. 298 Protecting and ensuring women’s rights is a noble and
worthy cause, but it does not outweigh legal precedent. Rather
than certifying the class, which will most likely force Wal-Mart
to settle, unless the class is decertified on appeal, the court
would have better served these women by denying class
certification and suggesting that they pursue their cases on a
smaller, more manageable scale. By bringing their actions
individually, these plaintiffs would have their claims heard and
the litigation would be conducted in its normal fashion, namely
“by and behalf of the individual named parties only.” 299
Aaron B. Lauchheimer †

298
See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. For Class Certification, at 5, Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Inc. (N.D. Ca. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
Even if Plaintiffs could survive Rule 23(a), they cannot survive Rule 23(b).
Plaintiffs essentially argue that it is irrelevant whether this litigation is
manageable or not because they are invoking Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs are
wrong. The Ninth Circuit, in a discrimination case involving a class of 15,000
(just 1% of the alleged class herein), disapproved a settlement and remanded,
directing the district court to consider manageability if the case proceeded at
all: ‘We have some concerns, largely relating to litigation management, as to
whether the case could be maintained as a class action if the litigation
continues.’
Id. (quoting Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003)).
299
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (citing Califano, 442 U.S. at 701).
†
B.A., Brandeis University, 2003; J.D. Candidate 2006, Brooklyn Law
School. The author would like to thank Professor Jayne Ressler, the staff of the
Brooklyn Law Review, and Executive Articles Editor Camille Zentner for their helpful
insights and comments. The author would also like to thank his parents, Mom and
Aba, for their unwavering encouragement and guidance. In addition, the author would
like to thank his in-laws, Joan and David, for their help and support. Finally, the
author is ever grateful to his wife, Pamela, whose insights, endless devotion and deep
understanding, made this Note possible.

